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ABSTRACT This article proposes a theoretical assessment of discourses on cyberconﬂict, and
of their relation to the current perception of the state of cyberspace. By contrasting the “bat-
tleﬁeld” approaches to cyberconﬂict with theoretical and factual materials on its social and
political impacts, this article suggests that the “battleﬁeld” terminology frames the discussion
of online security within a drive for the “militarization” of cyberspace. It concludes by pre-
senting generativity-based perspectives as a contribution towards addressing contemporary
challenges to network politics in cyberconﬂict theoretical frameworks. 
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RÉSUMÉ Cet article propose une évaluation théorique des discours sur le cyberconﬂit, et de
leur rapport à la perception actuelle de l’état du cyberespace. En opposant des approches du
type «champ de bataille» au cyberconﬂit avec des matériaux théoriques et factuelles sur ces
impacts sociaux et politiques, ce document suggère que la terminologie «champ de bataille»
encadre le débat sur la sécurité en ligne dans la militarisation de l’espace cybernétique.
L’article conclu en présentant des perspectives fondées sur la «  générativité  » comme
contributions pour relever les déﬁs contemporains aux politiques des réseaux dans les
cadres théoriques du cyberconﬂit.
MOTS CLÉS Culture eléctronique; Nouveaux médias; Internet/IP/WWW; Cyberconﬂit;
politique des réseaux
Introduction
Conflicts of varying intensity in cyberspace are now receiving generalized attention
and demanding new appraisals of the changing conditions of the online world. The
rise of cybercrime, the development of cyberweapons, political activism, and wide-
spread online surveillance also signal a changing online ecology. After several decades
of expansion, digital communication networks are now facing a restructuring based
on the ideas of control and stable “boundaries.”
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This stage of development is characterised by the colonization of cyberspace by
state and non-state actors seeking to strengthen control of information and infrastruc-
tures, in what can be read both as an attempt to limit online freedom and an effort to
strengthen network security. An image of the Internet as a battlefield is hence replacing
the utopia of networked computer-mediated communication in discourses of online
security, giving form to new policy approaches. Proponents characterize cyberspace
as increasingly chaotic, threatening, and in need of securitization. These discourses,
though divided in their approach of the “battlefield metaphor,” equate online com-
munication networks with a field of military-like strife.
This article proposes a critical theoretical assessment of discourses on cybercon-
flict, and of their relation to the current perception of threats to, or emerging from, cy-
berspace. In offering a critique of the “battlefield metaphor,” the aim is to show how
it narrows the discussion on online security issues, by contrasting it with approaches
focused on social and political impacts of cyberconflict. The use of a “battlefield” ap-
proach frames the discussion of online security around a drive towards securitization
and militarization of cyberspace, exacerbating some of the risks and threats, while dis-
missing the negative impacts of increased control and surveillance in online trust, free-
dom, and creativity.
Cyberconflict: Background and definitions
This section presents some concepts and definitions of cyberconflict and related phe-
nomena. The subsequent sections develop these concepts into a contrasting analysis
of some of the possibilities of theoretical approaches framing current discussions on
cyberconflict. In order to preserve a distinction between their original intellectual tra-
ditions, this article adopts “cyberconflict” as a more general term than “cyber warfare,”
the latter being a high-intensity form of computer-mediated conflict. “Cyberspace” is
loosely defined as a socio-technological sphere supported by a global infrastructure of
digital communication wherein informational exchange takes place.
Numerous reports from governments, civil organizations, military, security firms
and media have highlighted a rise in frequency of damaging cyber-attacks (Anderson
& Rainie, 2014; Cornish, Livingstone, Clemente & Yorke, 2010; Marinos & Sfafianakis,
2013; Reporters Without Borders, 2012; 2013; 2014). These attacks range from relatively
unsophisticated website defacements to targeted attacks with more harmful (poten-
tially physical) effects. Between these two examples it is possible to identify a contin-
uum of actions, supported by individuals, groups of people, governments, or even
thousands of personal computers under external control (botnets). Some of the ac-
tions fall in legal grey (as in the case of hacktivist practices) or dark areas (such as cy-
bercriminal activities). Other actions concern the ability of citizens and activists to
overcome informational and organizational barriers, such as in online forums, instant
messaging via mobile phone or computer, social network services, among many other
services.
Any conflict can be defined as “a situation in which actors use conflict action
against each other to attain incompatible goals and/or to express their hostility”
(Bartos & Wehr, 2002, p. 28). Conflict actions, in this sense, are the behavioural ex-
pression that may be placed along a scale of coerciveness; that is, between partial agree-
ment and complete disagreement. Rational dissent is one of the ways to establish al-
ternative positions in order to seek a new balance, and the exercise of high coerciveness
appears as a non-rational alternative that can be at odds with both sides’ interests
(Bartos & Wehr, 2002).
Cyberconflict can be defined as “conflict in computer-mediated environments (cy-
berspace),” in particular when effects spill over from the “real world” (Karatzogianni,
2006, p. 94). In other words, cyberconflict consists of the spread of conflict behaviour,
especially politically motivated action, in the digital realm. The motivations for action
can be played out in the political sphere by multiple kinds of actors, including social
movements, religious or ethnic groups, or political parties. Similarly, concrete action
may take many forms, ranging from advocacy to awareness-raising actions, in the case
of cyber activism (Vegh, 2003).
Thus, “cyberconflict” can be taken as an umbrella term referring to phenomena
placed along a continuum of conflict behaviour taking place via digital communication.
That continuum ranges from dissenting views in an online discussion to more complex
and high-intensity cyberwars. There are at least two dominant perspectives on cyber-
conflict that share this view of the networked sphere as a conflict space. There are,
however, important divergences between these two approaches regarding how to con-
ceptualize the diversity and seriousness of phenomena of online conflict, as well as re-
garding policy stances to adopt in their management.
The first of the perspectives, analytical in nature, echoes military and international
affairs studies of developments in the cybersphere and places emphasis on threats to,
and conflict among, states. The rationales of policybuilding, strategic planning, and
countermeasures development are represented by authors such as Arquilla and
Ronfeldt (1999; 2001), Libicki (2009), and Carr (2009). These authors prioritize the
need to protect ICT infrastructure, online services, and retaliation options. This group
is committed to the current international efforts for implementing concerted action
and international cooperation regarding cyberconflict, usually framed in the institu-
tional settings of international agreements and the military.
The second perspective focuses on civil society and open social discourse and
stems from a critical tradition. This type of approach is indebted to critical and media
theories, and rooted in the works of Foucault (1979), Deleuze and Guattari (1987), as
well as Hardt and Negri (2004). It focuses on the study of online debates and argu-
ments, as well as political and activist practices (online protest, hacktivism, among
others). It stresses the importance of the transition of political conflict and activism
into cyberspace, as illustrated by social movements and their use of digital tools
(Karatzogianni, 2008; Karatzogianni & Robinson, 2010). With respect to policy, this
perspective underlines the importance of participation and the democratization of po-
litical processes in the fulfilment of the potential for social progress of online conflict
in discursive arenas.
Digital networks as battlefields
The analytical tradition, which will be the subject of this section, is more concerned
with the construction of a theory of war in cyberspace. One key idea is that cyberspace,
just as geographical space, has its own salient points, and needs to be protected, both
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at the infrastructure and at the informational levels. Given that contemporary society
relies on ICT, it becomes a priority to understand how vulnerabilities can be corrected
or, conversely, exploited. It is in this sense that digital networks became a “battlefield”
for military intervention. This section concerns the adoption of the “battlefield
metaphor” as military doctrine for cyberspace during the early 1990s. It shows how
the conceptualization of cyberwarfare is linked to the promotion of a new military do-
main in cyberspace and the corresponding doctrinal body framed by the comparison
to a field of battle.
Military doctrine and the use of cyberspace
“Cyber warfare” (CW) denotes a particular case of cyberconflict, which takes the
shape of a state-level war in cyberspace, thus falling within the military realm. In
this case, actors seek political and military advantage by trying to disable the enemy’s
infrastructure (informational and other) via cyberspace. The transformation in atti-
tudes and discourses towards cyberspace policy stems from the perception of the
need for stronger, more sophisticated defences against cyber-attacks, particularly
with the integration of battle systems in encompassing potentially vulnerable digital
networks.
For some authors, CW is waged via strictly informational means. Drawing upon a
conceptualization of power as the ability to force the will of another actor, Carr (2009)
states that CW consists of the governments’ attempts to “force their wills against their
adversaries and find victory without bloodshed in the cyber domain” (p. 2). For this
author, cyber warfare is confined to the informational space and cannot be conceived
as causing physical harm. However, other authors do not exclude the use of conven-
tional weaponry with real-world effects and casualties. Clarke and Knake (2010) con-
sider cyber war the fifth domain of warfare, consisting of actions that aim to disrupt
computer networks, thereby damaging a nation’s infrastructure. With this in mind,
the authors argue that there must be an extension of the virtual battlefield to all as-
pects of online activity, and not just military targets.
This extension is due to the fact that network-centric military technology can be
seen as both an advantage (gathering and sorting information is crucial in wartime,
as are its interpretation and adequate use in the battlefield) and a vulnerability.
Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I)1 systems de-
pend on a network of satellites, antennae, cable networks, digital devices, unmanned
aerial vehicles, surveillance technology, and networked soldiers and weapons. Since
the 1990s, militaries are fully aware of the strategic and tactical advantages of crippling
the enemy’s use of cyberspace, or of using superiority in that field to achieve domi-
nance in other areas (for example, destroying the informational infrastructure that
underpins the enemy’s military command). The U.S. Cyber Command was created in
2010 to approach cyberspace as the fifth military domain; that is, as a new field in
which to wage war and exert military power (Singer & Friedman, 2014).
Cyber warfare refers to the exploitation of ICT for military purposes, with the in-
troduction of high-intensity conflict into cyberspace. The efforts of nation-states and
their militaries to bring doctrines and materials in line with twenty-first century tech-
nological and political trends have transformed warfare into a matter of control or use
of flows of information and communication. Along with this, a new discourse about
online security has been created, which argues for a further militarization of cyber-
space, embodied in a competition for cyberweapons and countermeasures.
The expansion of the “battlefield metaphor” to encompass communication net-
work activity seems to convert it into a potential target for the exertion of force or sub-
terfuge. The effect is amplified if the countries have in place a modern network and
rely on e-government structures. For example, attacks on government websites and
databases can cause confusion and bring the state bureaucracy to a stop. Furthermore,
the ability of the military themselves to wage even a conventional war has become in-
creasingly dependent upon a lattice of networked elements.
Networks as battlefields: The militarization of cyberspace
Concerns over nation-wide cyber security have been heightened in the first decade of
this century by news on cyberconflict that arguably contributed to exacerbating the
perception of threat. Examples include the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007 (Landler
& Markoff, 2007) and during the war in Georgia in 2008 (Danchev, 2008), several
“bursts” at the end of 2009, as well as more recent news about breaches in corporate
and state information systems. In the wake of these attacks, the United States an-
nounced a new policy for cyberspace (Clinton, 2010) that included the protection of
the commercial Internet and civilian digital infrastructure in its security concerns
(Markoff, 2010).
For Taddeo (2012a), any military intervention in cyberspace should be limited to
the preservation of the “well-being” of cyberspace itself, with care to ensure that no
further or greater disruption is introduced into cyberspace. Cavelty (2012) believes
that militarizing cyberspace in order to prevent misuse of the networks (both military
and civilian) is “based on fear” and ultimately “pointless,” in part because a large por-
tion of power in cyberspace is in the hands of private actors (p. 151). The 2013 revela-
tions by NSA private contractor whistleblower Edward Snowden have shown that
intelligence agencies’ approaches to cyber security have, in fact, taken into account
this factor, engaging private sector companies in their operations.
The creation of cyber weapons—i.e., computer code written with the specific pur-
pose of destroying or sabotaging military targets by taking control of targeted sys-
tems—is conceived as a form of military attack. One of the risks in using malicious
code as a weapon is its replication and reverse engineering, which may allow its use
or adaptation by other actors, originating new variants targeting similar control sys-
tems (Zetter, 2011a).2 The most well-known cyber weapon to date is the Stuxnet worm,
developed by the United States and Israel with the specific purpose of impairing or
delaying Iran’s uranium enrichment operations, thus crippling its nuclear program by
disabling parts of its infrastructure (Sanger, 2012; Singer & Friedman, 2014).
In spite of the concerns about a possible cyberwar, the most active sources of in-
security in cyberspace remain closer to the everyday realities of online fraud and espi-
onage. The relative success of online malicious criminal action and electronic
espionage (via malware and spyware, for example) triggered a generalized concern
with the vulnerabilities of online systems. “Cloud” services, online gaming companies,
financial institutions, e-commerce and government websites are favourite targets for
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criminal hackers, as they usually integrate personal, financial, and other important
data. In addition, successful attacks yield large amounts of confidential information,
along with wreaking havoc on the owners’ security and undermining trust.3
Cyber security firms and international agencies keep a record of threats and trends
of attacks, and find the online environment is fraught with malicious code of criminal
origin.4 The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) tracks six-
teen types of threats, among which only email spam is under control (Marinos &
Sfafianakis, 2013). This report illustrates a security problem for individuals, businesses
and governments, but also the development of an “arms race” between cybercriminals
and the cybersecurity sector. Mass-targeted attacks rely on simple methods, some of
which can be found on sale online, making them more prevalent (Greenberg, 2012a;
2012b). However, high profile “targeted attacks” and “advanced persistent threats”5
contribute disproportionately to the cyber security narrative and remain the over-
whelming concern of governments and companies in their policies for cyberspace
(Lawson, 2013).
In 2011, a green paper of the U.S. Department of Commerce acknowledged the
trust problem and identified the political need to address specific challenges, namely
“[e]nhancing Internet privacy; Improving cybersecurity; Protecting intellectual prop-
erty; and Ensuring the global free flow of information” (Department of Commerce
Internet Policy Task Force, 2011, p. iv). This follows a policy document of the Obama
administration, “The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative” (The White
House and National Security Council, 2011), which built on an earlier assessment of
nation-wide cybersecurity, published as “The Cyberspace Policy Review” (The White
House, 2009).
In this context, new strategies appear to take over the network “battlefield.” Cyber
security policies regulate technological infrastructure. A higher degree of control of
the core technological mechanisms of the Internet, such as IP addresses and DNS stan-
dards, is being put in place around the world (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski & Zittrain,
2008; 2010; DeNardis, 2012). During the Arab Spring, Internet kill-switches and other
devices put in place as security measures were used to shut down access in Egypt and
Libya. In June 2013, NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden brought new information
to light that confirmed concerns about online freedom. Snowden exposed a number
of covert programs that showed the extent to which online communication is being
monitored and analyzed by intelligence agencies as part of a program by the United
States and its allies to achieve a maximum of control of global digital communication
(Greenwald, 2014). In short, the socio-technological system of cyberspace is undergoing
a military turn, underpinned by the hyperbolization of systemic threats, and calling
for top-down approaches to network governance.
“Netwars”: Between cyberwar and online conflicts
The pattern of belligerence, which foreshadows the idea of the network as battlefield,
was criticised by Arquilla and Ronfelt (2001). In Networks and Netwars, the authors
suggested a much more nuanced view of cyberconflict as a discussion of information
warfare under circumstances of global, rhizomatic cyberconflict, outside the military
sphere. They suggested the term “netwar” as “a parallel concept about information-
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age conflict at the less military, low-intensity, more social end of the spectrum” (p. 2).
Their focus was on the digitally networked organization and coordination of activity
in the civilian world, potentially used for criminal, terrorist or radical action, and was
not yet addressed as a serious concern by governments. The “war” in “netwar” iden-
tifies an area of intervention and a new model of managing conflict, including a re-
thinking of the concept of global communication.
Arquilla and Ronfelt’s (2001) definition of “netwar” highlights the central aspects
of a “spill-over effect” from the physical to the online world, as well as the conse-
quences of a different model of organization for non-military engagements. “Netwar”
refers to “an emerging mode of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, short of tradi-
tional military warfare, in which the actors use network forms of organization and re-
lated doctrines, strategies, and technologies attuned to the information age” (p. 6). For
the authors, the transition to digital communication enabled a subversive turn by
being within reach of an unprecedented number of people. The decentralized, net-
worked methods available for “netwar” offer a greater array of options for groups seek-
ing non-conventional ways of organization and action. “Netwar actors” (Arquilla &
Ronfeldt, 2001) use the resilience and interoperability of digital networks to continu-
ously reconfigure their social networks, but also to attack, gather data, spread propa-
ganda and disinformation, or recruit (Karatzogianni, 2006).
The definition of “netwar” excludes cyber warfare, consigning it to the military
realm. It emphasises the juxtaposition of multiple social networks, and not just
Internet-related phenomena.6 The organizational aspects of this new form of conflict
are brought to the core of the concept. In the sense that the central matter for the
study of cyberconflict lies in the transition to ICT-based platforms in organization and
action, the actors might be recognizable (terrorist groups, identity thieves, smugglers),
new, mutated forms of old actors (so-called copyright pirates, black marketers), or
groups acquiring more sophisticated forms of organization (such as transnational ac-
tivists or hackers), as Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue (2001).
The decentralized, leaderless, and digitally networked aspects of the organization
of netwar prefigure a critical turn in the conceptualization of online conflict. By moving
away from a pure “battlefield” analysis towards a socially informed analysis, Arquilla
and Ronfeld (2001) introduced some aspects of a more critical view of cyberconflict. The
key features, as will be seen below, are a strong reliance on decentralized organization
and a high degree of dematerialization of conflict, heralded by generalized connectivity. 
Critical approaches to cyberconflict
The concept of netwar anticipates a socio-political turn in theories of cyberconflict,
one that underlines the importance of the decentralization of economic and political
power in the new networked environment. Initially, freedom of information, along
with the fluid construction of communication bonds, and the potential for new eco-
nomic opportunities, gave rise to optimistic perspectives heralding a new utopia of
networked communication (Castells, 2004; 2009; Toffler, 1989; 1991). In accordance
with their democratic potential, communication technologies would enable new
forms of work and knowledge, but also new forms of political action, social dialogue,
and protest. 
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This section is devoted to the contextualization of cyberconflict by a critical tradi-
tion concerned with the intersection of social phenomena with the online world.
Instead of underlining high-intensity belligerence as a major factor for policy, this set
of authors addresses the conditions in which antagonistic positions are deployed in
cyberspace.
The critical perspective to be explored in this section mobilizes social and media
theory to address the changes in power structures, social relations, and organizational
aspects. For example, the concern with digital rights (data protection, freedom of ex-
pression, freedom of information, privacy, among others) evokes issues such as cen-
sorship and surveillance, thereby translating into the digital realm global political
matters. The rhizomatic character of online cultures—its distributed, decentralized,
fluctuating and de-territorialized aspects (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987)—is essential to
understanding the global drive for regulating communication flows in cyberspace. The
rise of global virtual publics and of network politics signal demands for representation
and transparency at the international level, including the debates about online freedom
(Hardt & Negri, 2004). In pointing out the risks of disciplinary power converted into
surveillance and control (including social control via globalized media), this perspec-
tive is also indebted to Foucault’s (1979) work.
The multifaceted nature of cyber attacks can be ascribed to the networked logic
of global economic and political power, which makes every major player in the global
arena subject to highly visible cyber damage. As mentioned, politically motivated at-
tacks try to achieve maximum media impact with spectacular operations that disrupt
their targets’ operations (the oil company Saudi Aramco was one such target in 2012).7
With low opportunity costs and few barriers to entry, indifferent to national frontiers
and conflict frontlines, cyber-attacks seem to be a very attractive option for actors to
achieve notoriety or profit, and to spread uncertainty.
Soft strategies of managed cyber-conflict may also be linked to the emergence of a
“noopolitik”; that is, the constitution of a global communication sphere. The idea of
noopolitik addresses five trends of the end of the twentieth century: global intercon-
nection, the emergence of a global civil society, soft power, the cooperative advantages
rising from the changes in ICT, and the “formation of a global noosphere” (Arquilla &
Ronfeldt, 1999, p. 35).8 In brief, “[t]he noosphere concept thus encompasses cyberspace
and the infosphere and has its own technological, organizational, and ideational levels.
It relates to … the rise of network forms of organization that strengthen civil-society
actors” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1999, p. 14). The noosphere may be considered a multi-
layered network of norms, objects, ideas and human beings (Latour, 1993); that is, a
sociotechnical system enabling generative agency (Abbate, 2012).
The noosphere supports a decentralized, networked form of politics that relies
less on face-to-face sociability and more on looser forms of engaged civility, often taking
the form of deliberation on global causes. At this point, Athina Karatzogianni’s (2006)
distinction between socio-political and ethno-religious cyberconflict countenances a
broader view of the possibilities of computer-mediated conflict. The former consists
on the use of “the internet as an organizational and mobilizational resource, attempt-
ing to reframe issues and take advantage of the openings of the political opportunity
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structures” (p. 121). Ethnoreligious cyberconflicts are “real-world conflicts with eth-
noreligious characteristics which spill over into cyberspace,” in which “the groups in-
volved use the internet, not as a resource with which to reframe the issues, but rather
as a weapon” (p. 154). By acknowledging the socio-political potential of the cyber
sphere, the soft power conceptualization of cyber power suggested by noopolitik is in
line with the decentralization and de-territorialization mentioned above. The mani-
festations of social conflict depend to a large degree on the preservation of a pluralistic
and open environment in cyberspace.
Network politics and the promotion of generativity
The normative constraining of an open Internet culture produces changes in the online
articulation of power, communication, and sociability. This section will address those
changes, taking into account how analytical and critical perspectives deal with the bal-
ance between openness and security. The Internet and the networked environments it
sustains—businesses, entertainment, news, social networking services, political fora—
entered diplomacy and the political spotlight as a new “battlefield,” where heteroge-
neous political groups vie for control (Deibert et al. 2008; 2010; Mueller, 2004; 2010).
The expression “network politics” refers to the discursive political nexus between
technological, military, social and moral issues, or to ICT-mediated political action. It
can be seen as a form of technological politics for contemporary ICT; that is, as a “sys-
tem of order and governance” (Winner, 1978, p. 237). The Internet can be thought of
as a sociotechnical system where knowledge and communication flows are grounded
on a technical disposition of technological mechanisms (such as the TCP/IP protocol),
conditioned by organizational and normative decisions (Fuchs, 2005). In turn, these
decisions depend on the interaction of the multiple actors in policy arenas and their
ability to exert influence in the process. Traditionally, network technologies were in-
vested with emancipatory attributes. The idea of “independence of cyberspace”
(Barlow, 1996) dominated political and social discourse towards digital communica-
tion, despite heavy criticism of its techno-utopian character (Barney, 2006; Morozov,
2011; Winner, 2005).
Network politics can also be seen as shifting towards levels of control that affect
discursive practices by reframing digital rights (Deibert, 2003). Network standards and
mechanisms of regulatory control are also nodes of political and economic strife. This
became especially noticeable after 9/11 and the U.S.A.’s Patriot Act, when communica-
tion networks emerged as vital areas to be regulated and securitized in order to detect,
isolate, and eliminate terrorist threats. Additionally, the concentration of mass com-
munication companies during the last two decades has placed enormous power in
the hands of multinational companies, which, for access and content providers, may
amount to a “closing” akin to the one undergone by traditional information systems,
heralding a definitive change in the political nature of the Internet (Wu, 2012). Another
critical moment in this shift towards direct intervention in network politics was Hillary
Clinton’s (then U.S. Secretary of State) “Remarks on Internet Freedom” speech (2010).
In that speech, the optimistic view of the democratizing effects of information tech-
nologies was defined as foreign policy doctrine, signalling a willingness to intervene
to support computer-mediated efforts for democratic change.
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Some of the regulatory changes in network standards and protocols take place at
the international level, in institutional arenas such as the ICANN (International
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) and the ITU (International
Telecommunications Unit), which regulate the changes in protocols and standards.
This project to reframe some technical and normative aspects of the Internet is sur-
rounded by protest. Network activists interpret the renewed pressures for stricter con-
trols as attempts to impose restrictions on online freedoms and the values of Internet
publics (Massit-Folléa, 2012). Legislation and agreements, such as SOPA (Stop Online
Piracy Act), ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement) or PIPA (Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act), have
been subjected to close scrutiny by network activists. Although ostensibly promoted
in order to detect digital piracy, illegal file sharing, and cyber terrorism, these regula-
tions are criticised for establishing frameworks that restrict measures put in place to
preserve the anonymity of the data traffic of individual Internet users.
The arguments for the protection of network liberties invoke the advantages of
maintaining an open cyberspace. The idea of “generative systems” (Zittrain, 2009)
is useful to understand this concept of a dynamic environment in the sense that
“they are never fully complete, that they have many uses yet to be conceived of, and
that the public can be trusted to invent and share good uses” (p. 43). This notion is
consistent with the sociotechnological character of cyberspace—a hybrid, non-de-
terministic agency system affected by the creative practice of the actors involved
(Abbate, 2012).
Generative systems support creative practices and give network politics its partic-
ular connected outlook. The networked structures of the digital world present a diverse
environment for expression and exchange of ideas—discursive practices ranging from
political discussion and meme-building, to flaming in online newspaper comment sec-
tions. The Internet allows low-mediation participation in transnational causes, affect-
ing mobilization and communication by creating an alternative to institutional
channels. However, it may be constrained by access barriers or restrictive network poli-
cies (such as online censorship, filtering, or blocking). The political and economic uses
of the digital tools are multiple and constantly changing. Hackers and hacktivists, in
particular, represent the nexus between computer-mediated protest, digital rights ac-
tivism, and cyberspace-centric organization (Coleman & Golub, 2008; Denning, 2001;
Taylor, 1999). In sum, generativity creates an ecosystem that expands with little control
and a high degree of freedom. This openness explains the difficulty in achieving a sys-
temic balance between security and transparency in technology. Since technological
phenomena are socially constructed and not closed systems, they are vulnerable to
shifts in the priorities of institutional arrangements.
In contrast, non-generative systems value orderly and controlled environments
with a greater degree of restriction as to what can be coded and enunciated. Closed
systems are those that trade flexibility for security, establishing gateways and walls of
various types. Establishing barriers between or within systems not only means that
communities gather inside (and outside), but also that constant surveillance and ex-
clusion are needed to maintain the integrity of the systems. Closed proprietary systems,
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with their valuable databases and prominent security features, are a prime target for
hackers. They are perceived as violating the generative and open principles of the
Internet—not least because of sophisticated security measures and obscure privacy
policies—thereby justifying both financially and ideologically motivated attacks. 
Towards a critique of the “battlefield” metaphor
This last section links the discourses on cyberconflict to the “battlefield metaphor.” It
concludes by suggesting that arguments for the preservation of generativity in the on-
line world are not compatible with the dominance of a military rhetorical field.
Technical and strategic arguments in favour of tighter control of cyberspace have the
potential to obfuscate the political dimensions of cyberconflict, supporting the creation
of online security mechanisms with limiting and coercive effects, particularly in non-
democratic political regimes. They may, in other words, promote non-generative socio-
technological arrangements. They also present the online world as a territory in need
of walls and surveillance, lacking global democratic supervision, where safety concerns
overrule openness.
It must be added that the definition of the cyber domain as a space of military
domination is far from unanimous. Taddeo (2012b) avoids isolating CW in the cyber
sphere by characterizing cyberwarfare as “waged within the informational environ-
ment, with agents and targets ranging both on the physical and non-physical domain
and whose level of violence may vary upon circumstances” (p. 114). This definition
places CW on a continuum of intensity and across domains. It neither implies an in-
nocuous (non-destructive) form of war, nor precludes the use of further means to
deny CW capabilities to the enemies, but remains compatible with multiple non-vio-
lent forms of conflict behaviour. Rid (2012) questions the CW category itself as an in-
adequate construct precisely because it interprets warfare too loosely. For Rid, “all past
and present political cyber-attacks are merely sophisticated versions of three activities
that are as old as warfare itself: subversion, espionage, and sabotage” (p. 6). Rid argued
that recent incidents did not fulfil Klausewitz criteria for “war”—violence, instrumen-
tality and political attribution, and therefore it remains to be seen whether any war
can be waged with “code as the main weapon” (p. 29).
Current doctrine states that defensive mechanisms are fragile and prone to vul-
nerabilities that may be discovered and exploited, while offensive measures have an
“asymmetrical advantage” that is difficult to overcome (Liles, Rogers, Dietz & Larson,
2012).  The assessments of the resulting changes to Internet regulation and standards
made by international bodies point out that furthering the tracking of criminal, ter-
rorist and dissenting activities by extending controls to all information exchanges may,
in the medium term, also affect online public discourse (Dutton, Dopatka, Hills, Law,
& Nash, 2010; Mendel, Puddephatt, Wagner, Hawtin, & Torres, 2012). This idea is con-
sistent with critical studies of cyberconflict, which perceive the securitization of cyber-
space as a concentration of power that affects the property structure and regulatory
control of the Internet, thereby affecting online freedoms. This claim denies that the
securitization of cyberspace can accomplish the goals of eliminating cybercrime, deny-
ing cyberwarfare capabilities to state and non-state actors. In fact, the most evident ef-
fect of enforcing controls over servers, Internet service providers and Internet traffic
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in general, is the generalization of surveillance, and not a more secure online environ-
ment for citizens.
Most cyber-attacks are criminal in nature. Online criminal activity has more im-
mediate effects on the lives of citizens, and more damaging consequences, which de-
legitimize approaches to cyberconflict as a strictly military construct representing the
online world as a battlefield. A 2011 OECD study stated that cyberwar doctrines use
hyperbolic terminology and that a purely military approach has limited usefulness in
the protection of individual citizens against more probable risks (Sommer & Brown,
2011). In fact, by 2010, cyber security was becoming a top concern in the lists of per-
ceived public threats, along with terrorism, as a British poll revealed (AFP, 2010).
Spaces of debate and social networking services like Twitter, Facebook or YouTube,
among many others, are territories of symbolic strife, of conflict. Some of their charac-
teristics are borrowed from previous forms of online sociability, like multi-user dun-
geons (MUDs and MOOs), or online forums, and are carried over to those means of
synchronous and asynchronous communication. Online activists arguing for an open
Internet object to the commodification, concentration and regulatory efforts on the
grounds of their negative effects on generativity. Unwarranted walling or securitization
not only present challenges to online activism in all societies, but also to the genera-
tivity of the Internet as an inclusive, global communication network.
The decisive shift in approaches to cyberconflict has led actors to intensify the ex-
ploitation of digital networks, albeit with the explicit goal of securing them. Institutions
and governments implement security measures, despite indications that most
breaches can be attributed to human error, lack of awareness of online threats, and
over-reliance on ICT (Singel, 2010). This reasoning, akin to doctrines of physical war-
fare, prioritizes the acquisition of cyber capabilities, on the one hand, and the surveil-
lance of conflict in cyberspace, on the other, while the promotion of online security
literacy is overlooked. The regulation of cyberspace thus acquires new meaning, both
as a drive for better control of infrastructure on the part of national and international
entities, and as a form of implementing surveillance programs that target online dis-
senters as well as cybercriminals.  Noopolitics, as we have seen, calls for the adoption
of a soft approach to cyberconflict, more attuned to what may be called the post-mod-
ern, decentralized international system of cyberspace.
Conclusion
This article aimed to show that the “battlefield metaphor” approach to online security
and the future of online digital communication may contribute to narrow the percep-
tion of cyberconflict and its nuances. If cyberconflict is to be understood as a multi-
plicity of behaviours and actions, ranging from dialogue to the coercive, an excessive
focus on one of the ends of the spectrum is detrimental to that pluralism. Both the an-
alytical and the critical points of view acknowledge the role of computer-mediated
conflict in an age of digital communication, incorporating views on the purposes, ac-
tors, and institutions active in cyberconflict scenarios. However, the analytical ap-
proach can be contrasted by relying on a more negative perspective of conflict,
informed by the stringencies of a “battlefield” metaphor.
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By adopting this “battlefield” view, some of the recent regulating interventions
in digital networks face several pitfalls, contributing to reduced democratic, economic,
and sociocultural generativity. Firstly, their adopters are prone to obfuscate the root
causes of conflicts that democratic societies need to address, thereby placing limits on
the circulation of opposing views being played out in public spheres. Secondly, cyber-
crime remains a risk for everyday uses of digital devices, even as the emphasis is placed
on the protection against extreme scenarios of cyberwar and cyberterrorism. Lastly,
by militarizing and securitizing digital networks, they compromise established mech-
anisms of trust, tightening surveillance and control at the expense of privacy,
anonymity, and net neutrality.
The critical and analytical discourses are at odds with each other regarding the
degree to which the political economy of the Internet should be changed. This matter
does not seem to be amenable to a simplistic dichotomy of open versus closed digital
networks, of discursive conflict versus cyberwar. The main risks for individuals (and
social movements) pertain to data security breaches of trust and privacy, where human
error represents the weakest link. In this sense, the promotion of digital literacy and
of security standards for consumer services merits as much attention as the creation
of national and regional network security mechanisms. The preservation of the open-
ness of digital networks, both for its economic potential and for its communicational
affordances, does not rest solely on establishing security mechanisms. In fact, one of
the greatest challenges on the horizon for policymakers and online activists is the pro-
motion of online freedoms in an age of generalized surveillance. 
Notes
There are several other versions of the acronym (C3I, C4ISR), all referring to the ability to integrate1.
military forces and the data they produce or require in a seamless communications network.
“DuQu” was a computer worm that exploited a vulnerability in the Windows operating system. It2.
was discovered in October 2011 (Symantec, 2012) and was thought to be related with Stuxnet (discov-
ered in 2010), possibly as a non-destructive information-gathering tool (Zetter, 2011b). In February
2012, another form of malware known as “Mahdi” was discovered infecting computers in the Middle
East. Although it has not been attributed to any particular organization, it is thought to be a cyber-es-
pionage tool capable of extracting information from infected systems (Zetter, 2012). “Flame” was dis-
covered in the Middle East in May 2012. It exploited the same security weak points in operating systems
as Stuxnet.
Several examples illustrate the consequences and costs. In April 2011, Sony’s Playstation network3.
was taken offline and user information (name, address, e-mail, birthday, login information and pass-
word) was stolen. At the time, Sony advised its customers to be aware of phishing and scam attacks
(Kuchera, 2011a; 2011b). In December 2011, security firm Stratfor was attacked and user information
was stolen (Friedman, 2012). Events such as the Arab Spring revolutions, the Japanese earthquake,
Steve Jobs’ and Amy Winehouse’s deaths, and the 9/11 anniversary were used as opportunities for
scamming, phishing, and spreading spam in 2011 (Symantec, 2012). Attacks on certificate authorities
have also disrupted the digital world by undermining trust. Targets included Comodo, DigiNotar,
GlobalSign and Digicert. The attack on the Dutch company DigiNotar in June 2011 exploited the breach
of encryption keys to create false certificates. The loss of trust in its security certificates bankrupted
the company by September 2011 (Symantec, 2012).
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According to the security firm Symantec, in 2011, more than 5 billion malware attacks were blocked4.
(up from 3 billion in 2010), with 5,989 new vulnerabilities and 403 million unique malware variants
discovered, up from 286 million new variants in 2010 (Symantec, 2012).
“Targeted attacks use customized malware and refined targeted social engineering to gain unau-5.
thorized access to sensitive information … . Typically, criminals use targeted attacks to steal valuable
information such as customer data for financial gain. Advanced persistent threats use targeted attacks
as part of a longer-term campaign of espionage, typically targeting high value information or systems
in government and industry.” (Symantec, 2012, p. 14)
The “small world” effect in networks, along with their decentralized character and (almost) scale-6.
free structure are among the main changes to power relations. On the other hand, distributed decen-
tralized networks, like the Internet, are also prone to power law effects and hierarchization. This means
that, on the Internet, 1) not all nodes in the network are equally important to its functioning (acting
as “hubs”), and 2) adequate action can prioritize and target hubs according to the distribution of
weights in the network and/or preferential connection, thereby bringing to the fore a strategic aspect
of the topology of networked cyberspace.
An attack on August 15, 2012, infected “about 30,000 computers” (Saudi Aramco, 2012, p. 2) with7.
malware and forced the company to take its website offline, although it did not confirm the full extent
of the damage. A group calling itself “Cutting Sword of Justice” took credit for the occurrence (Fisher,
2012). 
The idea of “noosphere” is attributed to Teilhard de Chardin and Vladimir Vernadsky. For de Chardin,8.
the transformation of human cognition and consciousness is accelerated by technological progress
and the complexification of social relations, eventually achieving a degree of awareness known as the
“Omega Point,” the culmination of macro-evolution towards higher forms of consciousness, aided by
new, more sophisticated technological forms (de Chardin, 1964; 2003).
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